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Abstract 
For many years, professional baseball has enjoyed a privileged antitrust exemption apart 
from other professional sports.  With the passing of the Curt Flood Act in 1998 this 
exemption was removed; however, the act may not be as influential as it seems.  Court 
rulings were prominent in initiating and maintaining the antitrust exemption for 
professional baseball.  These include the Supreme Court Trilogy, especially the case of 
Curt Flood, a baseball player who fought against the reserve clause system which limited 
his and other players’ employment options.  Collective bargaining as well as arbitration 
became dominant in professional baseball labor relations under the jurisdiction of the 
National Labor Relations Board and the National Labor Relations Act.  Although the 
collective bargaining process in Major League Baseball has been contentious, it provided 
more bargaining power to the players, resulting in the elimination of many unfair labor 
practices including the reserve system.  The Curt Flood Act of 1998, which allows 
professional Major League Baseball players to file lawsuits under antitrust regulations, 
served as the final step in equalizing the power between players and owners.  Early 
predictions about the act concluded that it would either help strengthen baseball’s 
antitrust exemption or harm the collective bargaining process.  Other researchers thought 
that the act would not have much of an effect at all because of its limitations and 
requirements.  But others have noted some positive results, specifically in labor 
negotiations between players and owners, which point to the act having a genuine 
influence on Major League Baseball.  
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Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption and the Impact of the Curt Flood Act 
Antitrust Laws and Baseball’s Unique Exemption 
Labor relations in professional sports have long been characterized by control of 
the teams and owners over employed athletes, restricting their ability to determine the 
teams for which they would play as well as the amount of payment they would receive.  
Two specific areas which have been most prominent in limiting a player’s employment 
options are the player draft system and the reserve clause system.  The draft limits the 
players’ abilities to determine which team they will work for when starting their 
professional careers, while the reserve clause system restricted the players’ continued 
employment options once they were already in a sports league.  Both of these situations 
made the players essentially the property of their team and left their futures up to the 
determination of the team for which they played.  The ultimate issue with these systems 
is that the policies which favored the owners were being established and upheld by the 
owners, giving the players no way in which to have their interests addressed (Gilroy & 
Madden, 1977).   
For many years professional baseball has been an especially egregious infringer 
of players’ rights, enjoying a privileged antitrust exemption unlike other professional 
sports.  This antitrust exemption meant that professional baseball players, or anyone else 
who had cause, could not file a lawsuit against Major League Baseball (MLB) under 
antitrust laws (Gilroy & Madden, 1977).  Antitrust laws usually refer to the original 
legislation passed in 1890 known as the Sherman Act, which prevents companies from 
monopolizing trade in their industry and prohibits conspiracies intended to restrain trade 
or commerce (Bautista, 2000).  The act was vague in that the language used did not 
provide enough details for it to be taken at face value.  For example, the act outlawed 
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every contract that restrains trade, which could be taken to mean every contract in 
existence, since a contract necessarily limits the parties involved to only dealing with 
each other.  By wording the Sherman Act in this way, Congress in effect left the 
interpretation of the act and its scope to the judicial branch (Alito, 2009).   
Confusion about the applications of the law as well as a landmark ruling 
concluding that unions can be found guilty of conspiring to restrict trade caused Congress 
to enact exemptions to the Sherman Act in order to protect the collective bargaining 
process from antitrust laws.  These pieces of legislation include the Clayton Act of 1914, 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which 
collectively not only resulted in labor being exempt from the Sherman Act, but also 
created policies and guidelines encouraging bargaining between organized labor groups 
and management.  Other non-statutory exemptions have come through several rulings by 
the Supreme Court, including the United Mine Workers v. Pennington case, reaffirming 
the protection of the agreements created through collective bargaining negotiations from 
antitrust laws (Bautista, 2000).  
Baseball’s antitrust exemption has been a crucial contributing factor in hindering 
baseball players’ abilities to determine their own employment situations and in allowing 
the reserve clause system and other unfair labor practices to persevere through baseball’s 
extensive history (Gilroy & Madden, 1977).  With the passing of the Curt Flood Act in 
1998, the application of this antitrust exemption to labor relations in MLB was limited.  
The act did not completely remove the exemption, but instead allowed current MLB 
players to file lawsuits against MLB regarding matters of their employment under 
antitrust laws.  However, the ultimate impact of the act on the interactions between MLB 
players and owners, especially as seen in the process of reaching collective bargaining 
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agreements, is not easily discerned (Grow, 2009).  Three different opinions about the 
ultimate impact of the act have emerged as a result of careful evaluation of labor relations 
in MLB in the years since 1998.  These theories include that the act has had a positive 
effect on recent negotiations between baseball players and owners; that the rigorous 
procedures to enforce the act are too complicated to be useful; and that because of the 
impact of collective bargaining the act is ineffective (Bautista, 2000; Grow, 2009; Grow, 
2012).  
History of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption 
No legislation specifically addressed whether or not MLB possessed an 
exemption from antitrust laws before the passing of the Curt Flood Act in 1998.  Instead, 
court rulings were instrumental in initiating and maintaining the antitrust exemption for 
professional baseball.  Three cases known as the “Supreme Court Trilogy” are crucial to 
fully understanding the antitrust exemption afforded to MLB: the Federal Baseball case, 
the Toolson case, and Flood v. Kuhn (Wolohan, 1999).  
Predecessor to the Trilogy  
Prior to and influential in the ruling of the Federal Baseball case was the case of 
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase ruling.  In June of 1914, a baseball 
player for the Chicago White Sox of the American League of Baseball named Harold H. 
Chase was already under contract to play for the Sox when he decided to leave them and 
instead play in the newly formed Federal Baseball League with their Buffalo Club.  
Chicago attempted to prevent the move by seeking a court injunction since Chase’s 
contract was subject to the National Agreement (Wolohan, 1999).   
Earlier, in 1901, the American League of Baseball had been established and began 
to present a formidable threat to the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 
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which had already been in existence for 25 years.  After initially competing with each 
other for players, both leagues signed a contract in 1903 known as the National 
Agreement, assuring that the two leagues would be treated equally and would honor the 
other league’s player contracts.  But the agreement also included a promise that both 
leagues would observe the reserve clause which, along with other rules put forth in the 
agreement, set in place the foundation for what labor relations in professional baseball 
would be like for nearly 100 years (Alito, 2009).   
In the case of Chicago v. Chase, the courts decided to refuse the White Sox’ 
injunction on the basis that the contract and its reserve clause were unenforceable 
because of a lack of mutuality.  The courts recognized that the contract lacked equal 
obligation and remedy by both parties, as seen in the sole ability of the team to decide 
whether to terminate the contract or retain the player for the year following the contract’s 
expiration.  This ruling did two things for labor relations in baseball.  First, it set the 
precedent for the courts in not granting injunctions to baseball teams based on the player 
contract, because such a contract was not enforceable.  But it also set the stage for 
controversy over whether these contracts violated antitrust laws because the courts 
acknowledged the unfair qualities of the reserve clause system (Wolohan, 1999).  
After the ruling about the injunction was decided, the court began to further 
examine the actual reserve clause found in the contract as a result of the National 
Agreement to determine if it violated the newly enacted Sherman Act.  The courts 
determined that although organized baseball had created a monopoly within the United 
States and their agreement between the National and American leagues was clearly in 
violation of antitrust law, baseball did not constitute interstate trade or commerce.  
Instead the courts labeled professional baseball as a mere sport or game that did not fall 
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under the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act (Wolohan, 1999).  Despite this ruling, the court 
clearly disapproved of the involuntary nature of baseball’s contracts stating that the 
stronghold that organized baseball held on the players was “so great as to make it 
necessary for the player either to take the contract prescribed by the commission or 
abandon baseball as a profession” (as cited in Wolohan, 1999, p. 351).   
Federal Baseball 
The first part of the trilogy of non-statutory regulations that formed what is 
known as professional baseball’s antitrust exemption was the 1922 U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling in the case of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. the National League of 
Professional Baseball Clubs (Wolohan, 1999).  A new league of professional baseball, 
the Federal League, formed in 1913 and soon grew to rival the National and American 
Leagues, competing for spectators and players and quickly becoming successful.  
However, after only two years of competition, financial struggles forced the league to 
reach a peace agreement with organized baseball which dissolved the Federal League and 
therefore all of its member clubs (Alito, 2009).  The agreement only made provisions for 
two of the Federal League owners to buy into existing Professional Baseball teams and 
some of the players’ contracts to be auctioned off to National League teams.  This left 
most of the clubs, including the one in Baltimore, with virtually no options other than to 
fold and dissolve as well (Wolohan, 1999).  In reaction to the ruin of its organization, the 
Baltimore franchise filed an antitrust lawsuit against everyone that could be linked with 
the monopoly on baseball including both leagues, all of their teams, their current 
presidents, the National Commission president, the former league president, and the two 
owners who were able to join ties with current league teams (Alito, 2009).   
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Baltimore’s claim that the leagues acted in violation of antitrust laws in ways that 
caused damages to the Baltimore club was initially agreed with by the District of 
Columbia Supreme Court in 1917, who awarded the club $240,000 in damages as well as 
its attorney fees.  But that ruling was subsequently overturned by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which cited the Chase case from 1914 in defense of its 
ruling that baseball was not commerce or trade.  According to the definitions of the words 
trade and commerce in Webster’s Dictionary that the court used, the business of baseball 
did not include the necessary transfer of something such as people or goods.  The court 
concluded that the players and equipment which did move between states for exhibitions 
were incidental to the game and separate from the actual products being sold which are 
the baseball games (Alito, 2009).  The court noted that the providing of baseball 
exhibitions is “local in its beginning and in its end” (as cited in Wolohan, 1999, p. 353).  
The implications of these decisions were that the reserve clause and the actions of the 
leagues did not fall under the regulations of antitrust laws because they were related to 
the movement of the players and not the actual product, which in this case was the 
baseball games (Alito, 2009).   
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the Baltimore club appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court where the counsel for the defense added to the argument by saying that in order for 
baseball to even exist at all, it depended on being free from antitrust regulations (Abrams, 
1999; Alito, 2009).  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., reviewed the Supreme Court’s 
decision and provided the unanimous opinion for the court in 1922.  In his very brief 
analysis that consisted of only two paragraphs, Justice Holmes, much like the D.C. Court 
of Appeals, focused on whether organized baseball itself fell under the regulations of the 
Sherman Act instead of whether the particular actions of the defendants were in violation 
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of antitrust laws.  His analysis of the question of the business of baseball being interstate 
commerce centered on the idea that the nature of baseball was an intrastate affair, despite 
the necessity of players crossing city and state borders (Alito, 2009).  The Supreme Court 
agreed with the D.C. Court’s decision, holding that the business of baseball was not 
subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act (Wolohan, 1999).    
Despite many challenges and questions of its legitimacy, this ruling would survive 
for the next seventy-six years until the Curt Flood Act was passed in 1998.  The first test 
of the decision came before the next case in the Trilogy in the form of Gardella v. 
Chandler (Wolohan, 1999).  This case involved a player who was under contract to play 
for the New York Giants club for the 1946 season, but instead signed on to a Mexican 
league for one year before that league fell apart (Gallant & Staudohar, 2003).  However, 
upon his return to the United States he discovered that organized baseball had blacklisted 
him and he could no longer play baseball for any team.  The commissioner at the time, 
Albert B. Chandler, had put in place a rule banning any player who moved to the 
Mexican League from professional baseball.  Gardella decided to challenge his banning 
and in effect the reserve clause and the Supreme Court ruling in the Federal Baseball case 
by suing organized baseball (Wolohan, 1999).   
After the case was appealed to the Second Circuit Court in New York, the court 
purported that the addition of radio and television broadcasting of baseball games 
changed the nature of professional baseball to interstate commerce.  This meant that the 
case had the necessary legitimacy that was said to be lacking in Federal Baseball to 
warrant proceeding with the trial.  In his comments about the New York court’s two to 
one decision, Judge Frank claimed that the recent rulings of the Supreme Court made the 
Federal Baseball case outdated and no longer of any relevance.  The entire court also 
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showed an extreme disgust with baseball’s reserve clause which they said “results in 
something resembling peonage of the baseball player” (Wolohan, 1999, p. 355).   
Although the monopoly of organized baseball appeared to finally have been 
seriously challenged, the NY court realized that they did not have the authority to 
overturn a Supreme Court ruling.  Despite these initial promising opinions, the case was 
never heard after it was sent back to the Federal District Court of New York because 
professional baseball had settled out of court with Gardella by reinstating him into the 
league and offering him a sum of $60,000.  The case served as a serious scare for 
organized baseball, but after all the proceedings had ended baseball’s antitrust exemption 
still stood (Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).   
Toolson v. New York Yankees 
The next case in baseball’s antitrust exemption trilogy is that of Toolson v. New 
York Yankees.  George Toolson was a minor league pitcher under contract to play for his 
parent club, the New York Yankees (Wolohan, 1999).  Since the Yankees had more 
pitching talent than they needed, Toolson was asked to transfer to a lower level of minor 
league play, which would have seriously hampered his career when instead he needed to 
be advancing it.  When the Yankees decided to utilize the reserve clause in Toolson’s 
contract and prevent him from signing with another major league team, Toolson did not 
report to the team’s minor league affiliate (Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).  In an attempt 
to free himself from the Yankees while continuing to pursue a career in Major League 
Baseball, Toolson filed an antitrust lawsuit against the Yankees in 1952 (Abrams, 1999).  
By this time, baseball’s antitrust exemption had become an established principle in the 
courts, and once this case made its way to the Supreme Court it would be the first 
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opportunity for the judges to correct the exemption from the ruling in Federal Baseball 
(Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).   
But the Supreme Court determined in a one page decision that the ruling in 
Federal Baseball would remain and that the exemption for Major League Baseball would 
not be removed by the courts (Wolohan, 1999).  The court cited not only the original case 
in 1922 for its reasoning, but also the fact that in the 30 years following the verdict 
Congress had not acted against the decision.  Not only that, but Congress’s inaction had 
allowed baseball, and specifically the reserve clause system, to continue to grow under 
the understanding that it was protected from existing antitrust laws (Abrams, 1999; 
Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).  This decision was particularly interesting given that just 
prior to the case a subcommittee of the House of Representatives had concluded a hearing 
on the baseball industry, particularly the reserve system and baseball’s antitrust 
exemption.  In that hearing, Congress determined to take no action in reference to the 
antitrust exemption since it was assured that any error the Supreme Court might have 
initially committed in the Federal Baseball case would be corrected in the upcoming 
Toolson case (Abrams, 1999).   
Although the verdict was the same for Toolson as it was for Federal Baseball, this 
time the decision was not unanimous.  Justice Burton was one of the judges who argued 
for the opposition.  Much like the courts in the Gardella case had determined, Justice 
Burton thought that it was impossible to deny that baseball had changed enough since 
1922 to make the declaration that professional baseball was not interstate trade or 
commerce inapplicable.  Justice Burton also thought that only Congress should have the 
right to determine what businesses would be exempt from the Sherman Act and they had 
failed to pass any legislature granting baseball or any other professional sport this kind of 
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immunity.  Despite these reasons, the Supreme Court made its decision to maintain the 
Federal Baseball ruling and in doing so, determined that the legislative rather than the 
judicial branch would have to be responsible for changing the antitrust exemption 
originally granted in 1922, if it were to ever change at all (Wolohan, 1999).   
Flood v. Kuhn 
The final and probably most influential case in regards to the preservation of 
baseball’s antitrust exemption was the Flood v. Kuhn case.  The plaintiff, Curt Flood, was 
a baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals who had played at an all-star level, leading 
his team as a centerfielder to three pennants in the 1960s.  He had also been a highly 
regarded member of his community and well respected by his teammates and coaches for 
12 years (Abrams, 1999).  Then in 1969, the Cardinals traded Flood to the Philadelphia 
Phillies, without involving Flood in the decision or even informing him of the move until 
it was already completed.  Flood did not want to be traded and wrote a complaint to 
MLB’s Commissioner, Bowie Kuhn, asking to be declared a free agent so that he could 
talk with other MLB teams about playing for them (Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).  He 
made his intent clear: that the issue was not about money or location, but his right to 
choose his employer and not be subjected to a reserve system that felt like a form of 
involuntary servitude (Mathewson, 1999).  
The Commissioner refused to go against the Cardinals’ decision, which Flood 
approached as a question of civil rights, prompting Flood to file a lawsuit against the 
Commissioner, the two league presidents, and 24 MLB teams in 1970 (Abrams, 1999; 
Bautista, 2000).  Flood’s lawsuit claimed that MLB and their reserve clause system, 
which could force him to leave his profession of baseball if he did not comply with his 
team’s wishes, were in violation of Federal and state antitrust regulations.  Flood also 
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brought a new accusation against MLB when he added that the monopolization of 
baseball infringed on his 13th Amendment civil rights against involuntary servitude 
(Abrams, 1999; Gallant and Staudohar, 2003).  After the District Court and Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Flood’s claims on the grounds of the previous Federal 
Baseball and Toolson rulings, the case reached the Supreme Court once again.  This time 
the plaintiff had the backing of the MLB Players’ Association and former Supreme Court 
Justice Arthur Goldberg.  Almost 50 years after the original Federal Baseball case, the 
court was presented with yet another chance to remove baseball’s antiquated antitrust 
exemption (Abrams, 1999).   
But the Supreme Court came to the same conclusion as it had in the past, in a five 
to three decision, that professional baseball would still have a unique exemption from 
antitrust laws to continue its reserve system (Gilroy & Madden, 1977).  This time the 
court also examined the history of baseball and listened to some baseball players who 
talked about the reserve system before reaching its decision.  In his second year on the 
Supreme Court, Justice Harry Blackmun provided the controversial decision (Abrams, 
1999).  The court determined that the antitrust exemption was an established aberration 
that catered to baseball’s unique attributes and constraints necessary in order to sustain 
the game (Abrams, 1999; Bautista, 2000; Gallant & Staudohar, 2003).  Although the 
court agreed that the exemption was an “anomaly” and that baseball now undoubtedly 
engaged in interstate commerce, it determined that organized baseball should be allowed 
to keep its exemption because of the years of history during which baseball operated 
under its protection without judicial or legislative interference (Bautista, 2000; Gallant & 
Staudohar, 2003).  According to Justice Blackmun, the principle of stare decisis applied 
in this case and, once again, if anything was to change then it would have to occur by 
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Congress’s determination rather than the courts (Abrams, 1999; Champion, 2009; Gallant 
& Staudohar, 2003).   
 Providing the opinion for the dissent in the case was Justice Douglas who made 
the point that if this case were being examined for the first time without any prior history, 
then the opinion would be undoubtedly in favor of Curt Flood.  There would be no 
question as to whether baseball should be exempt from antitrust laws since baseball was 
clearly a trade involved in interstate commerce.  Justice Douglas also argued that 
Congress’ inactivity did not mean that the Supreme Court should not attempt to correct 
its mistake regarding baseball’s original antitrust exemption.  The inactivity of the 
legislative branch that the court’s decision relied upon was neither in favor of the 
exemption nor in opposition to it, Justice Douglas proposed, since Congress had not 
passed any laws providing professional baseball with a unique exemption either.  But 
these arguments were the minority opinion in the vote and baseball’s antitrust exemption 
was maintained once again (Wolohan, 1999). 
Following this ruling, the only challenges to baseball’s antitrust exemption in 
court occurred in regards to its scope.  In the case of Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn in 
1978, the owner of the Oakland Athletics baseball team, Charles Finley, decided to sue 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn for refusing to allow the sale of three Athletics players.  
Finley argued that baseball was exempt from antitrust laws in regards to only the reserve 
clause system rather the entire business of baseball.  The courts determined otherwise, 
ruling that any aspect of professional baseball was intended to be protected from antitrust 
laws in the Flood case.  A similar ruling was also given in the case of Professional 
Baseball School & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn in 1982 where the plaintiff argued that the player 
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assignment system, franchise location system, and league rules all violated antitrust laws 
(Wolohan, 1999).   
In other cases following these ones, the courts seemed to change their opinion and 
began to narrow the extent of the exemption.  In the case of Piazza v. Major League 
Baseball, the owner of the San Francisco Giants attempted to sell the team in 1992 to 
Vincent Piazza and Vincent Tirendi, who would relocate the Giants to Tampa Bay, 
Florida.  The National League President, Bill White, along with the Ownership 
Committee for MLB prevented the move and provided the Giants owner, Robert Lurie, 
with an alternative buyer who offered $15 million less than Piazza and Tirendi were 
offering.  The district court determined that the Flood ruling was limited to the reserve 
system, not the purchase, sale, and relocation of baseball teams which was being 
evaluated in this case.  The case never reached its 1993 trial date as MLB reportedly 
settled with Piazza and Tirendi for $6 million (Wolohan, 1999).   
But MLB’s actions prompted other lawsuits including Butterworth v. National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs in 1993, where the court upheld the initial opinion 
and interpretation found in the Piazza case, remarking that it defied normal reason for 
baseball to have that broad of an antitrust exemption while other professional sports did 
not (Champion, 2009).  Other cases, such as Postema v. National League of Professional 
Baseball in 1993 and Morsani v. Major League Baseball in 1999, came to the same 
conclusion as in Butterworth that baseball’s antitrust exemption was limited to the 
reserve clause system.  But the courts were not completely unified on this interpretation, 
as the ruling in McCoy v. Major League Baseball in 1995 stated that according to the 
opinions in the Supreme Court Trilogy the exemption was intended to encompass all of 
baseball (Wolohan, 1999). 
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Influence of Collective Bargaining on the Reserve System 
Since legislation and the courts failed to free MLB players from the constraints of 
the unfair labor practices within MLB, it was now left to the players themselves to 
overcome these obstacles (Abrams, 1999; Hylton, 1999).  The majority of changes in 
baseball regarding unfair labor practices such as the reserve clause system came not 
through the courts, but rather as a result of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.  In 
the case of baseball, the act provided the means for unionized players to negotiate 
agreements with their employers, which would be MLB and its teams.  The statute forces 
both parties to negotiate in ‘good faith’, meaning with the intent to reach an agreement, 
although not mandating that they actually reach one.  The courts then included in the 
act’s list of mandatory bargaining subjects all the ways in which free agency systems in 
professional sports are regulated (Bautista, 2000).   
The players took advantage of this new outlet for their requests to be recognized 
when in 1954 they formed the Major League Baseball Players’ Association (MLBPA).  It 
was initially fostered into existence by MLB to provide the players a way in which they 
could communicate with the owners, with the intent of preventing the players from 
forming a union.  This communication system allowed the players to present requests to 
the owners, who still controlled whatever changes would be made in a one-sided manner 
(Bautista, 2000).  Then in 1966 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was 
responsible for overseeing the collective bargaining process, granted the MLBPA 
certification as a union under the NLRA.  This allowed the MLBPA to begin negotiating 
with MLB regarding labor restrictions including the reserve clause (Hoffman, 1969; 
Gallant & Staudohar, 2003).   
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What really took the organization from being a society of players to a powerful 
acting union was the transformation of the MLBPA in the late 1960s by Marvin Miller, 
the director of the union (Abrams, 1999).  Miller was known for his bargaining resume 
and his ability to improve salaries and working conditions for those he represented.  In 
1969, at the same time that Miller was hired, the NLRB acknowledged that since MLB 
was interstate commerce, it would be under the NLRB’s supervision while also subject to 
the stipulations of the NLRA.  This was a very important breakthrough for the players 
because it allowed them to not only unionize and collectively bargain with MLB, but also 
to enjoy protection from unfair labor practices in a way that could not be affected by 
baseball’s antitrust exemption (Bautista, 2000). 
The reserve clause system was initially restrained after an allowance for an 
independent arbitrator to hear salary disputes from players was included in the 1973 
MLB collective bargaining agreement, or CBA (Bautista, 2000; Gallant & Staudohar, 
2003).  In 1976, the players used a salary dispute to challenge the reserve clause system.  
The MLBPA brought the case before the chosen arbitrator, Peter Seitz, claiming that the 
reserve clause in a player’s contract should only be binding for the first year following 
the contract’s expiration.  The owners argued that the clause could be interpreted to allow 
a team to renew a player’s contract perpetually.  But Seitz determined that such a right 
could not be construed from the text of the clause (Bautista, 2000).  He also declared that, 
apart from an express contractual agreement between a player and a team, players could 
not be subjected to a reserve clause as it was described in the current MLB rules.  
According to Seitz’s interpretation, such a reserve system could however be a legitimate 
part of MLB if it was specifically included in a CBA upon which both parties agreed 
(Gilroy & Madden, 1977).   
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This ruling initiated free agency in baseball, despite objections by the owners and 
their attempts to have the decision overruled in courts.  The courts had already been in 
the practice of protecting anything found in a CBA that resulted from bargaining in ‘good 
faith’ from antitrust lawsuits, and MLB’s agreed upon arbitration process was not 
excluded.  This protection of CBAs is commonly known as the ‘non-statutory labor 
exemption’ and continues to prevent the actions of labor unions, including strikes, from 
being prohibited by antitrust laws (Gallant & Staudohar, 2003).  In the time following 
this influential change in MLB, the players were able to remove the effects of the owner’s 
monopoly of baseball on players’ employment, much to the same ends that antitrust laws 
would have done (Abrams, 1999).  Although the collective bargaining process has better 
equalized the power between the MLB and the MLBPA, the relationship between the 
owners and players has frequently been contentious and involved work stoppages 
(Bautista, 2000).   
After the players went on strike during the 1985 season over a disagreement about 
whether or not to include a salary cap or revenue sharing system in the new CBA, the 
owners decided together to try to curb the quickly escalating player salaries by agreeing 
amongst themselves not to sign any free agents.  Donald Fehr, the MLBPA president who 
succeeded Marvin Miller, argued in an arbitration grievance that the MLB owners had 
colluded together in an unfair labor practice.  The arbitrators agreed with the MLBPA in 
1990 and awarded the players monetary compensation.  The relationship between the 
owners and players would not get better for a long time and the owners frequently 
participated in bad faith practices in order to combat the loss of control they were 
experiencing.  Positive steps were taken such as the 1990 collective bargaining session 
which, following a lockout by the owners, resulted in a new CBA and a new 
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understanding by both parties of the necessity of approaching the table in good faith 
(Bautista, 2000).   
However, in 1994, one year after the 1990 CBA expired, both parties had been 
bargaining for about two years without reaching a new agreement.  The players decided 
to strike in July of 1994 and the owners reacted by cancelling the entire season, including 
the World Series.  Both parties accused the other of not bargaining in good faith and the 
situation escalated to the point that President Clinton intervened, causing a federal court 
to pass an injunction forcing baseball games to be continued under the rules of the 1990 
CBA while the owners and players continued negotiations.  After four years of 
negotiations, they finally reached an agreement that was to last until the year 2000.  
These situations were evidence of an increasingly bitter environment where owners and 
players in baseball acted in regards to their own interests, rather than working together 
for the good of the game (Bautista, 2000). 
The Curt Flood Act of 1998 
The Curt Flood Act serves as the most recent step in equalizing the power 
between players and owners in labor relations.  Following the troublesome 1995 season, 
senators in Utah, Vermont, South Carolina, and New York decided to introduce a new 
bill called ‘The Curt Flood Act’ to address the need for antitrust regulations in baseball 
(Bautista, 2000).  The bill was introduced in 1997 and when MLB and the MLBPA heard 
of it, they both agreed during collective bargaining gatherings to cooperate in supporting 
and promoting the legislation (Bautista, 2000).  With the approval of professional 
baseball, the senators added an amendment and then submitted it for the Judiciary 
committee to approve in 1997.  In 1998, over seventy-five years after the Federal 
Baseball case had initially provided the antitrust exemption, the House of Representatives 
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as well as the Senate passed the Curt Flood Act, and then the President signed it into law 
(Bautista, 2000; Edmonds, 1999).  
The Curt Flood Act’s stated purpose is to provide professional major league 
baseball players with coverage under antitrust laws and “the same rights under the 
antitrust laws as do other professional athletes” (Curt Flood Act, 1998, sec. 2).  The act 
amends the Clayton Act by including a new section at the end of it describing exactly in 
what ways antitrust laws apply to MLB (Bautsta, 2000).  The first aspect of this 
description is that it does not apply to the minor leagues, the first-year player draft 
system, the Professional Baseball Agreement between major and minor league baseball 
teams, or any other form of baseball besides MLB (Curt Flood Act, 1998; Hylton, 1999).  
To combat the long history of misinterpretations regarding which areas the antitrust laws 
apply, the act contains specific descriptions of what should not be subjected to antitrust 
laws.  These areas include the business of baseball as it relates to franchise expansion, 
location and relocation, ownership transfers, marketing and sales, licensing, and the 
relationships between the Commissioner and the owners as well as employers and 
employees including umpires.  The act also gives a detailed definition of who qualifies as 
a major league baseball player.  But the most important part of the act is that it declares 
the business of baseball and all of the actions of the persons in MLB related to the 
employment of MLB players to be subject to antitrust laws as they would be in any other 
professional sport involved in interstate commerce (Curt Flood Act, 1998).  This means 
that only the actions by MLB associated with player relations, including things such as a 
salary cap and the reserve clause system, would be under antitrust scrutiny according to 
the act (Wolohan, 1999). 
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Just before the act was passed, members of Congress made a few remarks about 
the bill which are noteworthy.  Representative Henry Hyde said that the act serves as a 
historical breakthrough where baseball players, owners, and the minor leagues all agreed 
on how to apply antitrust laws to the business of baseball.  He also argued that given the 
tumultuous past of these parties, Congress needed to realize the importance of passing 
this bill. According to Hyde, the legislation needed to be extremely narrow so that the 
current successful state of collective bargaining in baseball would not be affected.  He 
noted that the bill was specifically written so that only a limited portion of the antitrust 
exemption would be removed, leaving the rest of it intact.  Other speakers, including Jim 
Bunning, a US representative from Kentucky as well as a member of the Baseball Hall of 
Fame and former member of the MLBPA Executive Board, agreed that although the act’s 
scope was very limited and did not completely remove the antitrust exemption, it was a 
good first step (Edmonds, 1999).  
Impact of the Curt Flood Act  
Early opinions about the effect of the Curt Flood Act agreed that instead of 
removing baseball’s antitrust exemption, it in effect strengthened it (Wolohan, 1999).  
Critics pointed to the potential hindrances as well as the extremely narrow application of 
the act as reasons for this opinion (Edmonds, 1999; Grow, 2009).  Since the act does not 
apply to any players besides those in major league baseball, it leaves much of the 
business of baseball under the old antitrust exemption (Mathewson, 1999; Hylton, 1999).  
This is in contrast to the court cases that followed Flood v. Kuhn, which had been in the 
habit of ruling that only baseball’s reserve system was under the antitrust exemption 
(Mathewson, 1999).  By intentionally narrowing the scope of the act, Congress 
effectively left the rest of baseball exempt from antitrust laws (Hylton, 1999).   
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However, some have argued that leaving a portion of the antitrust exemption 
untouched actually helps prevent baseball from being a monopoly, since that would allow 
Congress to better direct the actions of Major League Baseball owners towards 
precompetitive ends.  With a weapon such as the threat of completely removing MLB’s 
antitrust exemption, Congress is able to influence the owners’ decisions, especially 
regarding the league’s expansion and the movement of its franchises (Grow, 2012).  But 
this influence was used in other areas besides just the growth of the league.  In the mid-
2000s, Congress was also able to use this threat to encourage MLB to implement stricter 
PED testing standards and policies for its players (Grow, 2012).  Once the exemption is 
fully removed, Congress will not only lose this power, but will also have no leverage 
with which to pressure the owners into implementing good labor practices (Grow, 2012).   
Another reason that the Curt Flood Act does not present a legitimate threat to the 
antitrust exemption is that the requirements for a player to file a successful antitrust 
lawsuit under the act are complicated and rigorous (Matzura, 2009).  A part of these 
restrictions is that only current MLB players are protected under the act and furthermore 
the act only applies to league actions that affect those players’ employment (Edmonds, 
1999).  Another way in which the act was intentionally limited was in regards to what is 
known as the non-statutory labor exemption.  This exemption allows collective 
bargaining and federal labor laws to supersede any antitrust claims from employees or 
employers.  The reason this exemption was put in place was because collective action 
such as strikes and lockouts by a union or management could potentially be regarded as 
impeding commerce in the business’s market (Edmonds, 1999).   
In an attempt to protect labor unions from federal injunctions, Congress passed a 
statute which declared unions to be legal groupings that did not restrain trade.  This law 
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was not very effective in the courts since in a case shortly following the legislation, 
strikes were ruled to be in violation of antitrust laws, using a limited interpretation of that 
statutory exemption of labor law to justify the decision.  In other cases, the legislation did 
not protect actions by a union that were done for the interests of other parties, such as 
other labor unions, nor those that involved a conspiracy between employees and 
employers to manipulate the labor environment beyond what was necessary for the 
purposes of bargaining (Edmonds, 1999).   
Then, in 1976 in the case of Mackey v. National Football League, the court of 
appeals removed the confusion and established what is known as the three-prong test 
used to apply the non-statutory labor exemption.  The first part states that any action 
where a restraint on trade only affects the parties involved in collective bargaining is to 
be protected under the exemption.  Secondly, the only kinds of agreements that can be 
exempt are those concerning mandatory bargaining items, as determined by the NLRA.  
Lastly, the exemption can only apply to agreements that have been reached by genuine 
arm’s-length bargaining (Edmonds, 1999; Matzura, 2009).  
Since the non-statutory labor exemption was enacted and clarified, both unions 
and management groups have learned that anything agreed upon in a collective 
bargaining situation is protected from antitrust laws.  Because of this, the players’ union 
in a professional sport must be decertified in order for topics discussed in collective 
bargaining negotiations to be brought to court in an antitrust lawsuit.  This decertification 
process is difficult and time-consuming, which may deter the MLBPA from attempting to 
file a lawsuit under this act.  However, there have been some examples of successful 
sports union decertification.  In 1987, directly following the strike by the National 
Football League Players Association, a group of players successfully filed an antitrust 
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lawsuit against the NFL apart from their union and passed the Mackey three-prong test in 
court.  But this did not occur until the players became desperate as the season was played 
without them and replacement players were used on the field (Edmonds, 1999).   
A final proposed reason that the Curt Flood Act might be damaging to the 
relationship between MLB players and owners is that allowing MLB players to be 
protected under antitrust laws will subvert the collective bargaining process.  This is a 
possibility since the opportunity to get out of an impasse by means of a lawsuit is a 
tempting alternative to the difficult task of working through the issues at the bargaining 
table.  With the option of an antitrust lawsuit, both players and owners will have little 
reason to offer real compromises and the negotiations will end up with the parties putting 
up fronts instead of bargaining.  Based on what has happened in other sports, researchers 
predict that if baseball players were to file antitrust lawsuits as individuals every time that 
they do not achieve their desired results, then labor solidarity among the players would be 
destroyed.  One last point is that once antitrust lawsuits are used, they tend to be relied 
upon more and more often instead of negotiating (LeRoy, 2012). 
Other researchers predicted that the Curt Flood Act would not have much of an 
effect on labor relations in Major League Baseball (Grow, 2009; Curtis, 1999).  Because 
it contains so many limitations on what areas antitrust laws apply to baseball, the Curt 
Flood Act does not affect most of the business of baseball.  Although it is possible that 
the act will help change some things in labor relations, it is unlikely that its influence will 
be dramatic or that it will serve as the final part of baseball’s antitrust exemption story 
(Curtis, 1999).  Since both baseball owners and players were pushing for the act to be 
passed, it can be inferred that its purpose was merely as a symbol rather than a catalyst 
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for change (Abrams, 1999).  The cooperation by both parties also could be simply a sign 
of their eagerness to repair their previously hostile relationship (Curtis, 1999).   
The employment changes due to the collective bargaining and arbitration process, 
combined with the players’ increase in bargaining power, may have made the Curt Flood 
Act altogether irrelevant (Grow, 2012; Mann, 2012).  By the time that the act was passed, 
free agency, which was one of the main goals of removing baseball’s antitrust exemption, 
was already common practice (Hylton, 1999; Mathewson, 1999).  The act can be seen as 
only a symbolic reaction to Curt Flood and his revolutionary actions, and not intending to 
change the situations which he was revolting against.  Also, the act was long overdue, 
coming after Curt Flood and many of his peers had not only left baseball but had also 
passed away, so the act only benefits current players who are no longer facing the same 
difficulties that originally necessitated this act (Hylton, 1999; Mathewson, 1999).  
However, some have pointed out that the progress in removing unfair labor practices 
could be halted or even reversed through collective bargaining in the same way in which 
it was achieved (McGettigan, 1999).   
Other evidence challenging the act’s necessity includes that there has not yet been 
a MLB player who has filed a lawsuit under the Curt Flood Act nor has there been any 
attempt to decertify the MLBPA in preparation for such a lawsuit (Grow, 2009).  Also, 
due to the complicated measures needed to successfully file a lawsuit under the act 
(including decertifying the union and halting the collective bargaining process), the value 
of antitrust action under the Curt Flood Act may be so small that it is only used as a last 
resort rather than a legitimate option (Edmonds, 1999).   
Despite these views, recently there have been noticeable, positive effects of the 
Curt Flood Act on labor negotiations between players and owners (Grow, 2009).  The 
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valid threat of antitrust action by major league baseball players was predicted to instigate 
otherwise reluctant owners to participate in good faith collective bargaining (Bautista, 
2000).  Evidence of this has been seen since the Curt Flood Act and its threat of antitrust 
action have forced the MLB owners to approach collective bargaining with the MLBPA 
more cautiously.  In the three most recent negotiations, MLB has tried to impose policies 
such as a salary cap on the MLBPA and even attempted to force the cap on players’ 
salaries during an impasse, at which point the NLRB had to intervene.  But in the 
negotiations for the 2002 CBA, the owners did not even bring up the issue of a salary cap 
for the first time in over twenty years.  The owners also made a promise that they would 
not attempt to unilaterally impress any policies on the MLBPA in the future.  Prior to the 
act, MLB had experienced five collective bargaining situations in twenty-four years that 
had all been contentious and resulted in eight work stoppages in that period of time 
(Grow, 2009).   
Although the decertification of the MLBPA would be required and although it has 
not yet been attempted, the opportunity for the players to file a lawsuit, which was not 
previously available, is now present.  It is highly unlikely that one of the most clever and 
astute unions in professional sports would have lobbied so much for an act that would 
prove useless.  This threat is even more valid in light of the fact that unions in other 
professional sports leagues, including the National Football League and the National 
Basketball Association, have successfully used decertification to either file a lawsuit or 
compel owners to negotiate in good faith (Grow, 2009).   
Some would argue that recent peaceful negotiations have resulted from other 
factors such as the financial success of the league and the unwillingness of both parties to 
hurt the league with another work stoppage (Grow, 2009; Staudohar, 2003).  However, 
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neither of these reasons are enough to support the drastic change in the collective 
bargaining atmosphere for MLB.  It is not a coincidence that the current state of peaceful 
negotiations, including reaching two consecutive collective bargaining agreements 
without labor stoppages, has occurred since the enactment of the Curt Flood Act.  The 
same critics who argued that the Curt Flood Act would have no effect also predicted that 
the strife between MLB owners and players would continue, which has not been true.  
This is not to say that the Curt Flood Act was the only reason that negotiations have gone 
so well in MLB recently.  But as Steven Fehr, an outside counsel for the MLBPA, 
pointed out, the Curt Flood Act provides a positive effect on the environment of MLB’s 
collective bargaining negotiations (Grow, 2009).  
Conclusion 
Throughout the years, MLB’s antitrust exemption has been supported, analyzed, 
criticized, and defended by anyone who had an opinion and the ability to make it known.  
Although originally intended in the Federal Baseball case to allow for the business of 
baseball to operate without interference according to its unique aspects, the ruling 
eventually became outdated.  MLB was no longer the small grouping of clubs that did not 
foster business between states other than the players and teams travelling for games.  The 
business of baseball grew to accurately fit the description of interstate commerce, yet the 
exemption stayed intact.  The Supreme Court, who initially enacted the exemption, 
passed the responsibility of fixing the situation to the legislature, who in turn went quiet 
on the subject for over seventy-five years.  It was not until after two more significant 
court rulings, Toolson and Flood, as well as many other smaller cases, that the exemption 
was partially lifted by the Curt Flood Act of 1998.  
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Although the Curt Flood Act removed a portion of the antitrust exemption, 
collective bargaining was more influential in removing the reserve clause and other unfair 
labor practices.  But it came with a cost, as the sudden equalizing of power between 
owners and players caused disagreements and tension between the two parties, much of 
which still lingers today.  Many of these collective bargaining sessions have led to 
harmful work stoppages that threatened baseball’s very existence.  Once free agency 
began, owners felt the financial burden of rising costs as they attempted to outbid other 
teams for the best players.  As contract salaries skyrocketed, the relationship between the 
owners and players grew even more hostile, with both parties acting in their own best 
interests, putting aside the well-being of the sport.   
However, since the Curt Flood Act was passed into law, both the MLB and the 
MLBPA have improved in their approaches at the bargaining table.  There is optimism 
that the recent peaceful negotiations are going to become regular occurrences in the 
future, now that the players are protected under the Curt Flood Act.  But researchers are 
aware that there are many factors involved in the relationship between the owners and the 
players, making it difficult to attribute all of the positive steps in collective bargaining to 
the influence of the Curt Flood Act.   
Other opinions have pointed out that the act’s constraints leave much of the 
business of baseball still exempt from antitrust laws.  The Curt Flood Act may turn out to 
be inconsequential because of the arduous process required to decertify the MLBPA 
before bringing a lawsuit to court.  It is still unclear if the act was in actuality a symbolic 
way to honor a great baseball player, with no intended impact on the present day 
relationship between MLB owners and players.  There is still much more research to be 
done and evidence to be examined once MLB players have had more opportunities to 
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bring their disputes with owners to court under antitrust law.  Whether or not the case for 
baseball’s antitrust exemption has finally been settled still remains to be seen.  
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